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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Aberdein uses argumentation schemes to address two theoretically significant matters 
concerning communities of argumentational practice (hereafter “argument 
communities”): first how argument communities can be distinguished from one another, 
and second whether the plurality of argument communities, which Aberdein links to a 
rich notion of Toulminian argument fields, leads to epistemic relativism. After amending 
Aberdein’s conclusions with a suggestion pertaining to the first issue, I argue that the 
tools Aberdein provides are not sufficient to extricate us from the dangers of relativism. 
 
2. ARGUMENT COMMUNITIES 
 
For Aberdein, argument communities are defined and distinguished from one another 
along three indices: domain (subject matter); community (subjects or arguers) and 
practices (specifically including argumentative practices). Key amongst the last of these 
is the use (both varied and constant) of argumentation schemes by different argument 
communities. Aberdein (p. 9) holds that schemes are useful “in the individuation and 
classification of communities of argumentational practice,” arguing that “it is possible to 
distinguish communities of arguers by tracking the schemes they employ, subject to 
several points of clarification.” 
At first blush, considering argumentation schemes seems to be a promising way of 
distinguishing argumentative practices. For example, surely the frequency with which a 
group relies upon appeal to witness testimony, and the confidence which it accords to 
conclusions based on testimony, indicates the degree to which that community holds 
testimony to be a reliable source of knowledge. And, communities can have different 
views on this point. Further, different branches of inquiry often study different domains 
or use different methodologies. Just as the data for these branches of inquiry might vary 
(facts about the weather are relevant to meteorology but not to mereology), so too might 
the useful inferential strategies. For example, one might expect disciplines concerned 
with necessary, a priori truths to rely more on reductio as a proof method than a 
discipline concerned with contingent, a posteriori truths. Since, for contingent claims, 
DAVID M. GODDEN  
neither the claim not its negation will imply a contradiction. Similarly, communities 
concerned with universal truths will rely more upon, and treat the results of, counter 
examples differently than those seeking general truths that are only true-for-the-most-
part. 
Aberdein gives four examples to illustrate the ways in which a community’s use 
of argument schemes can distinguish that community from others. Generally, these 
examples go towards showing that a mere inventory of schemes alone – even a 
comparative one – is not sufficient to distinguish argument communities. In addition to 
itemizing the schemes employed within the practice, a satisfactory account of a 
community’s argumentative practices should also (and here I quote directly): 
 
1. track frequency of use for the schemes (including those omitted altogether), 
paying particular attention to schemes whose use is disproportionate to that in 
comparable practices 
2. record information, explicit or tacit, about preferences amongst the 
community with regard to specific schemes; 
3. relate each scheme to the context(s) of dialogue employed by the community; 
4. where possible, observe how the practice changes with time. (Aberdein, p. 9). 
 
Since none of Aberdein’s examples are comparative, it is not entirely clear how 
the use of schemes will differentiate argument communities, even when the additional 
points are taken into consideration.  
For example, consider a group of reasoners who routinely consult different 
experts, who are granted some kind of epistemic authority, in order to learn how their 
personal relationships are affecting their lives and what decisions they should make in 
these matters.  In one sense, each member of the group uses the argumentation scheme of 
appeal to authority. Suppose further that those who consult the authorities have similar 
attitudes about those schemes in these respects: (1) the group members consult with the 
authorities with roughly equal frequency; (2) they equally prefer such appeals to authority 
over the use of other, perhaps more self-reflective or self-reliant, methods; (3) these 
expert consultations occur in roughly the same situational or dialogic contexts; and (4) 
their practices continue in roughly the same manner over time – that is, each group 
responds similarly with changes in the ostensive success of the advice given. But 
consider now that some members of this group consult their psychic, some their 
counselor, others consult their psychiatrist, others consult their guru, and others the leader 
of their cult, while still others consult their mothers. The question is, does this group 
constitute one argument community or several?  
 I suggest that these groups constitute different argument communities despite 
their using the same scheme in roughly similar ways. What differs between these groups 
is not their pattern of reasoning, or the general mode of reasoning (appealing to 
authority), or their use of it, but rather the warrant that they find acceptable. I suggest that 
their different attitudes concerning who counts as a proper authority – that is, on what 
counts as an acceptable warrant in an appeal to authority – distinguishes them into 
different argument communities. Thus, I suggest that it is not the use of a scheme but the 
acceptance of a warrant that will help to distinguish different communities of arguers.  
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COMMENTARY ON ANDREW ABERDEIN 
 
3. ARGUMENT COMMUNITIES, SCHEMES AND EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM 
 
Moving on to the issue of epistemic relativism, Aberdein argues that the spectre of 
relativism should be exorcised from Toulminian fields and communities of 
argumentational practice for three reasons: (i) code-switching, (ii) extra-field judgements 
and (iii) argumentation schemes. 
 
i. code-switching: “membership in communities of practice is not exclusive: 
many individuals operate successfully in multiple, overlapping communities 
simultaneously. ‘Code switching’ between different communities is 
commonplace and seemingly unproblematic. This suggests the possibility of 
intersubjective comparison.” (p. 2) 
ii. inter-field judgements “standards of evaluation are not exclusively field-
dependent: there is no requirement that only the standards developed within a 
community should be applied to the products of that community.” (p. 2) 
iii. argumentation schemes: “the practices of different communities may be 
articulated using a common apparatus: that of argumentation schemes” (p. 2) 
 
In response, I will try to show that these are neither severally nor jointly sufficient to 
alleviate the problem of relativism. 
 Let us start with (ii), inter-field judgements.  That I can apply a standard external 
to the standards of some other community to judge the arguments of that other 
community does not show that there are field-independent standards. Rather, it shows 
only that one can, using the standards of his or her own field, make inter-field as well as 
intra-field judgements. Notice that this is a descriptive claim about the inferences arguers 
actually can, or do, make – not a claim about the objectivity of the inferential standards 
arguers use. Indeed, it does not even demonstrate that there is any commensurability or 
reconcilability amongst cross-field judgements. To show that there are genuinely 
objective (extra-field or perhaps trans-field) judgements, one also has to show that there 
are field-independent standards of judgement, and it is those standards that are applied 
when making judgements about the argumentative products of other argument 
communities. But this claim about the nature and foundation of the standards employed 
in some field or other is not demonstrated by observing how arguers employ some set of 
standards. 
Moving on to (i), code-switching. That I can routinely move between argument 
communities, does not show that there are any objective, field-independent standards 
either. Rather it seems to show that at times I can employ the field-dependent standards 
of one field, field-A, in making judgements, and at other times I can employ the equally 
field-dependent standards of some other field, field-B. Even when combined with the 
practice of making inter-field judgements, this still only shows that I can make 
judgements about the claims of some given field using a variety of different, yet field-
dependent standards. None of this provides a common standard by which the judgements 
made using the standards of some particular field may be compared or evaluated. 
Surely it is true that, in code-switching, I can now communicate with, and even 
reason with, members of a different field in ways that non-code-switchers cannot. Yet 
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this type of intersubjectivity does not lead to any objectivity in any comparisons code-
switchers might make. Rather it shows only that I can, using the field-dependent 
standards of some field (say, field-A), compare the judgements made in a variety of 
different fields, say B, C, and D. But, it would be quite a different thing to make the same 
comparison using the field-dependent standards of some different field (say, field-B). 
And, there is nothing in this practice to suggest that there is any common, objective or 
extra-field standard by which I might compare those comparative judgements. To avoid 
the problem of relativism, one must not merely show that there is a possibility of 
intersubjective comparison – after all, different subjects within the same field can easily 
compare their different yet field-dependent judgements. What is additionally required is 
some claim about the objectivity or field-independence of the standards being employed. 
Finally, when considering (iii) argumentation schemes, it is not entirely clear 
what this can add to (i) and (ii). If the schemes, their usage, or (as I have suggested 
above) the acceptance of warrants, differs from one community to the next, then we seem 
no further ahead. If, on the other hand, there are some schemes, warrants or standards that 
are common to several or all communities, this only shows that there is some small-“u” 
universal standards or patterns of argument. Since there is no guarantee that further 
investigation could never find some community of hitherto unknown madmen who do not 
share these standards, this does not solve the problem of relativism at a theoretical or 
foundational level. Rather, it merely suggests that there might be some universal 
agreement on our relative judgements in cases where the   standards are common or 
shared. Perhaps this is the best that can be hoped for. 
If, though, it is to be demonstrated that relativism can be avoided, it seems to me 
that a very different type of argument must be provided. Further, given Toulmin’s thesis 
that the norms of argument evaluation are field-dependent, this might instead prompt a 
different response: the abandoning of fields altogether as evaluative categories of 
argument. 
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